UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-30-2019

State v. Perkins Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46873

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Perkins Appellant's Brief Dckt. 46873" (2019). Not Reported. 5899.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/5899

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
10/30/2019 9:47 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9307
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DANIEL WAYNE PERKINS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 46873-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-18-38767

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Perkins asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed two
consecutive fixed sentences of ten years—the maximum sentence allowed under the statute—
after his guilty pleas to two counts of sexual exploitation of a child.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June of 2018, a search warrant was issued for Mr. Perkins’s residence after authorities
conducted an investigation, which indicated Mr. Perkins was in possession of sexually
exploitative material that he was sharing with other users of a specific online network.
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(Presentence Report (PSI), p.3.)1 During a search of Mr. Perkins’s computer, authorities located
“numerous child pornography photographs.” (PSI, p.4.) Subsequently, Mr. Perkins was taken to
the Ada County jail, and, because he was on parole and a registered sex offender, an agent’s
warrant was served on him. (PSI, pp.112-13.) In July of 2018, a forensic examination of
Mr. Perkins’s computer was conducted, and the examiner found that the computer contained
“667 pictures and video files depicting child exploitative material . . . .” (PSI, p.4.) The
examiner also located 19 videos of Mr. Perkins’s

daughter getting dressed and

undressing in her bedroom. (PSI, p.4.) Authorities also discovered additional pictures and
videos depicting child pornography on a flash drive that Mr. Perkins’s wife found in his vehicle.
(PSI, p.6.) Subsequently, Mr. Perkins was charged, by Information, with ten counts of sexual
exploitation of a child, and one count of video voyeurism. (R., pp.35-38.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Perkins agreed to plead guilty to two counts of sexual
exploitation of a child and stipulated to the district court imposing a ten-year fixed sentence
between the two counts; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the other counts and also
stipulated to a ten-year fixed sentence with the parties free to argue any indeterminate time at
sentencing. (Tr., p.10, L.6 – p.11, L.11; R., p.63.) Mr. Perkins then pled guilty to willfully
accessing or possessing “an image showing 16 thumbnail pictures taken in sequence where the
pictures show a prepubescent female child, approximately

, performing oral sex

on an adult male’s penis and having vaginal sex with the adult male.” (Tr., p.14, L.17 – p.16,
L.9.) He also pled guilty to possessing a “video depicting a nude female child, approximately, 6
to

laying on her back on a bed with a yellow rope tied around her wrists and a yellow

rope tied to both of her ankles and where an adult male is holding the child’s waist and buttocks
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All citations to the PSI refer to the 892-page electronic file.
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up off the bed and appears to be having vaginal sex with the child, and where the child can he
heard moaning, in what looks like, grimacing in pain.” (Tr., p.16, L.10 – p.17, L.9.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose a
sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed. (Tr., p.23, Ls.9-12.) Mr. Perkins’s attorney
emphasized that Mr. Perkins accepted responsibility for the offenses and struggled with
posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of the severe sexual abuse he had endured as a child.
(Tr., p.25, L.5- p.26, L.23.) She said that there “was some part of him that was viewing these
images maybe in an attempt to try to understand his previous abuse and putting himself in the
position of the victim . . . .” (Tr., p.26, Ls.4-8.) With respect to the prior abuse, and his recent
diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder, she said, “[I]t’s pretty clear that this is a part of the
problem, and so in his mind, he believes that he finally has kind of a key to what is causing this
repeated behavior.” (Tr., p.26, Ls.14-23.) She then requested that the district follow the plea
agreement for ten years fixed time and left the indeterminate time to the district court’s
discretion.

(Tr., p.28, Ls.3-5.)

The district court said it did not have “much hope” that

Mr. Perkins was willing to change, and it imposed two fixed sentences of ten years and ordered
that the sentences run consecutively. (Tr., p.32, Ls.2-20; R., pp.77-80.) Mr. Perkins filed a
notice of appeal timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.82-83.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed two fixed sentences of ten years and
ordered that the sentences run consecutively?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Two Fixed Sentences Of Ten Years
And Ordered That The Sentences Run Consecutively
Given the facts of this case, Mr. Perkins’s two consecutive sentences of ten years fixed
are excessive because they are not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. When there is a
claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will conduct “an
independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8
(2016). In such a review, the Court “considers the entire length of the sentence under an abuse
of discretion standard.” Id. An appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry when an exercise
of discretion is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863
(2018).
The fourth factor is the most important for sentencing purposes. “When a trial court
exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’”
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)). Unless it
appears that the length of the sentence is “necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution,” the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is excessive “considering any
view of the facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and
therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
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There are multiple mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Perkins’s sentence is
excessive under any view of the facts. First, he struggles with mental health issues that are
clearly tied to the severe sexual abuse he suffered as a child, and he was only recently able to
fully disclose the nature of the abuse as he realized that it was still affecting his mental health
and his behaviors, and he admitted that he wanted and needed help. Mr. Perkins recently wrote
his wife a letter in which he gave a detailed accounting of what happened to him as a child. (PSI,
pp.26-29.) He explained that, when he was between the ages of four and six, his stepfather
would use brutal punishment techniques on him that included picking him up by his hair or
hitting him in the mouth. (PSI, pp.7, 26.) He wrote that his stepfather would “always [find] a
way to reduce [him] to tears and exploit [his] weakness as a child.” (PSI, p.26.) And when
Mr. Perkins cried, his stepfather would taunt him about “crying like a girl” and would say things
like, “I’m going to show you what men do with crying little girls.” (PSI, p.26.) His stepfather
would then take Mr. Perkins’s face and shove it in his crotch; he would also put underwear on
his head to shame him, but this behavior “quickly progressed” to forcing Mr. Perkins to perform
oral sex on him. (PSI, p.26.) Later, his stepfather anally raped him while threatening him with
knives and guns. (PSI, p.26.) Mr. Perkins said that his stepfather told him that if he told anyone
about the abuse, he would “cut up” his mother with the knives. (PSI, pp.26-27.) He also said
that his stepfather would sometimes insert the barrel of the gun he was holding into his rectum.
(PSI, p.26.)
Mr. Perkins went on to write that he was also sexually abused by his special education
teacher. (PSI, pp.27-28.) He said the teacher initially seemed interested in helping him and
eventually offered to take him fishing, and his mother said it was okay for him to spend the night
at the teacher’s house. (PSI, p.27.) However, he said that once he was locked inside the house,
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the teacher abused in the same ways his stepfather had. (PSI, pp.27-28.) He said he was “afraid
to tell anyone and deeply ashamed,” but he found out shortly thereafter that the teacher had left
the school.

(PSI, p.28.)

Nevertheless, he began to blame himself for these events and

“wondered what it was that [he] was doing that men always seemed to sense that [he] could be
an easy target . . . .” (PSI, p.28.) He said he often thought that he had done something wrong to
cause the abuse, and this resulted in confusion, anger, and self-loathing. (PSI, p.26.)
Mr. Perkins wrote that, by the time he was in fourth grade, he was a “troubled kid,” and
his mother could not handle him, so he was sent to stay with his sister and brother-in-law. (PSI,
p.28.) He said that, while they did not abuse him sexually, they used him “as a slave on a daily
basis.” (PSI, p.28.) He said he was forced to clean dishes that had been piled “up for days,” and
he was left alone to care for his sister’s young children. (PSI, p.28.) He wrote that if he
complained at all, his sister would hit him in the mouth. (PSI, 28.) He said that on one occasion,
his brother-in-law made him stand in a corner and beat himself with a piece of wood in front of
company, and when he cried in pain, the adults in the room would laugh while he “sobbed in
humiliation.” (PSI, p.28.) Ultimately, he was sent to the Idaho Youth Ranch where he endured
even more abuse. (PSI, p.29.) Regarding this experience, he said, “This really began to cement
the idea for me that I was somehow doing something to cause people to treat me this way.” (PSI,
p.29.)
Mr. Perkins said he later went to the St. Anthony’s juvenile correction center, but by that
time he was “determined to never be a victim again no matter the cost.” (PSI, p.29.) He said he
“fought for all [he] was worth, never backing down or giving up.” (PSI, p.29.) He also wrote
that all of this abuse “went unresolved,” but every time he would bring it up, he would get “shut
down.” (PSI, p.29.) He said that every father figure he had when he was a child had abused him
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in one way or another, and for some reason he found himself “needing to relive the abuses [he]
had endured.” (PSI, p.29.) He explained that when he would look at child pornography, he
“masturbated . . . by inserting a dildo in his rectum.” (PSI, pp.16, 49.) He said he was “reliving”
the things that happened to him when he was a child. (PSI, p.16.) He also stated that he did not
want to do things to the children in the images; rather, he wanted to “be them.” (PSI, p.16.) He
said, “I got the images from the internet and used them to envision myself as the persons in the
images being abused. I would remember being abused and picture myself.” (PSI, p.6.) He
could not explain why he wanted to relive his abuse but said that looking at the images and
videos “provided a little relief.” (PSI, pp.7, 16.) He also wrote that he “never wanted to be a
monster or hurt anyone,” and he felt dirty and ashamed for wanting to relive his abuse, and he
needed and wanted help. (PSI, p.29.)
Not surprisingly, the abuse that Mr. Perkins suffered as a child led to serious mental
health disorders. He was diagnosed with depression in 2013, a post-traumatic stress disorder in
2014, and a bipolar disorder in 2018. (PSI, pp.16, 72.) A defendant’s mental health problems
and abusive childhood are well-established mitigating factors that should be considered by the
district court at sentencing. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) (“Idaho Code § 19–
2523, which requires that the trial court consider the defendant's mental illness as a sentencing
factor, was an integral part of the legislature’s repeal of mental condition as a defense.”); State v.
Walker, 129 Idaho 409, 410 (Ct. App. 1996) (indicating that the district court appropriately
considered “Walker’s age as well as the fact that he had been sexually assaulted as a child”).
Similarly, the support of family should also be considered as mitigating information. See
State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293 (Ct. App. 1991). And Mr. Perkins still enjoys the support of
his wife. At the sentencing hearing, she acknowledged that she and her daughter had been in
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counseling to address what had occurred but nonetheless asked the district court for leniency
because Mr. Perkins had never participated in treatment for the abuse he endured, and he could
not get that treatment through the IDOC. (Tr., p.22, Ls.8-17.) She also said that Mr. Perkins was
a “good man,” who had a “lot of life left in him” and deserved an opportunity to “get the
treatment he needs and be able to contribute to society as an old man.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.18-22.)
Additionally, when Ms. Perkins spoke with the presentence investigator, she said she believed
that Mr. Perkins behavior was the result of “many factors,” including “his molestation, never
disclosing it to anyone until recently, not receiving any treatment to learn to cope with the
victimization or the feelings he had of being a terrible person because he allowed it to happen to
him at age 4 . . . .” (PSI, p.13.) She went on to say that Mr. Perkins had been a “good husband
and great father” who always helped out neighbors in need. (PSI, p.13.) She said he was “not a
monster,” and hoped that he could finally get the treatment he needed to appropriately process
what happened to him as a child. (PSI, p.13.)
Additionally, Mr. Perkins started his own business in 2017, and he was working 60 hours
a week before he was arrested. (PSI, p.15.) Before that, he had worked in construction,
trucking, and welding. (PSI, p.59.) His positive work history was yet another mitigating factor.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, had
been steadily employed, enjoyed his work, and expressed a desire to advance within his
company).
Mr. Perkins also accepted responsibility and expressed remorse over these offenses. See
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that some leniency was required, in
part, because the defendant expressed “remorse for his conduct”); Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594
(reducing the defendant’s sentence, in part, because “the defendant has accepted responsibility

8

for his acts”). In this case, at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel explained that Mr. Perkins
“took full responsibility for his actions” from the time she first met with him. (Tr., p.25, Ls.1214.) And, in his comments to the court for the PSI, Mr. Perkins said he recognized the harm of
his actions, and he was “truly sorry” for that. (PSI, p.19.) He said again that he “genuinely”
wanted help for his issues and was willing to work on his problems. (PSI, p.19.) Similarly, the
presentence investigator noted that Mr. Perkins “stated repeatedly” that he wanted counseling
and was “ready for treatment to address his molestation and feelings of guilt.” (PSI, p.21.)
In light of the wealth of mitigating information in this case, the district court’s sentences
were excessive and unduly harsh. Indeed, the district court imposed the maximum sentences
allowed under the statute for both offenses. See I.C. § 18-1507(3). It also ordered that the
sentences be comprised of all fixed time and run consecutive to one another. (R., p.78.) As
such, it is clear that the district court did not adequately consider the mitigating factors in this
case. In fact, it never mentioned the mitigating information at sentencing, and it did not consider
or discuss Mr. Perkins’s mental illnesses other than to say that it did not believe that he looked at
the images and videos as therapy for his PTSD. (Tr., p.28, L.12 – p.33, L.22.)
Moreover, Idaho’s appellate courts have regularly held that consecutive sentences, when
there are compelling mitigating circumstances, are excessive. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101
Idaho 125, 126 (1980); State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998); State v.

Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Amerson, 129 Idaho 395, 407 (Ct.
App. 1996). Similarly, in State v. Munroe, 97 Idaho 457, 457 (1976), the Court ordered that
Mr. Monroe’s three 14-year sentences be run concurrently instead of consecutively because
the acts that led to the convictions were part of a “common plan or scheme.” And, in Cook v.
State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008), the court held that the district court abused its
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discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences, and it modified some of the sentences to run
concurrently. It noted that Mr. Cook was

when he was sentenced, and it stated that

“to incarcerate Cook for, at a minimum, the determinate twenty-nine years would be nearly the
equivalent of imposing a life sentence given the relatively advanced age Cook will have reached
in a prison setting by the time he is even eligible for parole.” Id. at 486, 489. It also went on to
state that “such a sentence essentially discounts any possibility for rehabilitation and successful
reentry into society.” Id. at 489.
In this case, as in Munroe, Mr. Perkins’s behavior was also part of a common scheme or
plan; he was using the images and videos for the same reason. Additionally, Mr. Perkins was 46
at the time he was sentenced (PSI, p.1), so the determinate 20 years is almost the equivalent of a
life sentence.

More importantly, his sentences discount any possibility for rehabilitation.

Particularly in light of the fact that Mr. Perkins has now fully disclosed his prior abuse and come
to terms with how it has affected his behavior for years, he deserves an opportunity to prove
himself on parole and seek appropriate treatment for his mental health issues.
Indeed, Mr. Perkins’s sentences were unreasonable because they were not necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing in this case. Society would be protected if Mr. Perkins was
placed on parole after a ten-year fixed sentence and required to seek ongoing treatment. Such a
sentence would also serve as a strong deterrent and ensure there was significant retribution for
his crimes. But most importantly, it would give Mr. Perkins a chance at meaningful, long-term
rehabilitation through specific and targeted treatment. Instead of considering this, however, the
district court simply said it did not believe Mr. Perkins. (Tr., p.29, Ls.5-14.) It said it would
order the fixed sentences into execution immediately because, “I cannot imagine a scenario
where I believe it would be appropriate for the parole board to release you, given your history,
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given what you have done in the past and what you did here.” (Tr., p.32, Ls.21-25.) This
perspective discounted any possibility for Mr. Perkins’s rehabilitation. It also discounted the
mitigating information in this case. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed the harshest possible penalty for Mr. Perkins’s offenses because it did not reach its
sentencing decision through an exercise of reason, and it did not act consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Perkins respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 30th day of October, 2019.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
RPA/eas
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